Primary and final energy are accounting ledgers; useful energy shows what the economy actually gets.

Final Energy Is Official. Useful Energy Steers The Transition.


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The COP31 proposal for electricity to supply 35% of global final energy demand by 2035 is useful, ambitious and better than a renewables target on its own. It pushes the climate conversation beyond power generation and into vehicles, buildings and industry, where fossil fuels remain embedded. It also exposed a mistake in my own thinking.

In a recent RenewEconomy article, I got the COP31 target right in one sentence and wrong a few paragraphs later. The target was final energy, but I treated it as if it were close enough to useful energy to apply the primary-energy correction I have used for years. That framing was wrong because final energy and useful energy sit on different sides of the customer’s equipment.

Michael Liebreich helpfully pointed out the final/useful confusion, and both Liebreich and Jan Rosenow have published excellent work on this distinction. Liebreich’s question about the COP31 target — electrification of what? — is the right one. Rosenow’s framing of electrification as electro-efficiency is the right complement, because electrification is not simply fuel switching. In many major end uses, it reduces the amount of delivered energy required to provide the same service.

The distinction is simple, but important. Primary energy is raw energy entering the system. Final energy is energy delivered to users. Useful energy is the portion that actually performs work, heat, light or motion after end-use conversion. Primary energy is the legacy supply ledger, final energy is the legacy delivery ledger, and useful energy is the transition steering metric.

Much of my energy writing has been built around the primary energy fallacy, the idea that a decarbonized economy has to replace all fossil primary energy one-for-one. It does not, because a great deal of fossil primary energy is waste heat, upstream loss and conversion loss. The economy does not want barrels, tonnes of coal or cubic metres of gas for their own sake. It wants useful services: heat, light, motion, shaft work, computation, comfort, logistics and industrial output.

That primary-energy correction remains valid. Primary energy is a poor guide to the scale of a mostly electrified economy because it gives fossil fuels a legacy advantage by counting energy before large conversion losses occur. Coal is counted before power plant losses, oil before engines turn much of it into heat, and gas before boiler, furnace or turbine losses. Primary energy is useful for supply accounting, commodity flows and historical energy balances, but it is a bad steering wheel for the transition.

My error was importing the right correction into the wrong denominator. Final energy is not primary energy. It measures what reaches users: fuel, electricity or heat at the customer boundary. That makes it visible to meters, invoices, tax systems, distributors, customs records and national statistics, which explains why COP uses it. International climate diplomacy needs numbers governments can report, compare and negotiate.

But final energy is still not what the economy gets. It is what crosses the customer boundary before the user’s equipment turns it into useful work or wastes it. A litre of diesel reaches a truck as final energy before most of it becomes heat. A kilowatt-hour reaches an electric motor before much more of it becomes useful motion. A unit of electricity reaches a heat pump before the heat pump gathers additional ambient heat from the air, ground or water.

That boundary becomes more important as electrification spreads. Electric drivetrains move vehicles with far less final energy than internal combustion engines. Heat pumps deliver multiple units of heat from one unit of purchased electricity. Motors, induction, arc furnaces and other electric processes change the ratio between energy delivered and useful output. In a successful transition, final energy can fall while useful service rises.

This is why a final-energy electrification target needs a warning label. The COP31 35-by-35 proposal does not say electricity should provide 35% of primary energy by 2035. It also does not say electricity should provide 35% of useful energy services. It says electricity should reach 35% of final energy demand. That is an official and useful target, but it is not a direct measure of how much of the economy has actually electrified.

The difference is not academic. Coal-fired electrification can raise electricity’s share of final energy without delivering the emissions result required. Resistance heating can raise electric final energy where heat pumps would have delivered far more useful heat per unit of electricity. EVs and heat pumps can make a country look less electrified than it is in service terms because they shrink the final-energy denominator as they replace combustion. A final-energy target without a useful-energy companion leaves too much room for lazy interpretation.

None of this means final energy should be discarded. It is official, measurable and institutionally useful. If electricity is not rising as a share of final energy, then transport, buildings and industry are probably not moving fast enough. It is a good scoreboard. The problem comes when the scoreboard becomes the steering metric.

Useful energy would not be perfect either. A useful-energy layer would require transparent assumptions about engines, boilers, motors, heat pumps, lighting, industrial process heat, appliances and equipment stock. It would need country adjustments and confidence ranges. Analysts would argue about heat pump coefficients of performance, vehicle efficiency, industrial heat assumptions and regional equipment performance. Those are better arguments than pretending final energy tells us how much useful service has moved from combustion to electricity.

The institutional fix is mostly will, not physics. COP31 can keep the 35-by-35 final-energy target as an interim administrative measure, but it should be paired with a useful-energy companion table. The IEA and IRENA should publish annual useful-energy estimates by country, sector and end use, derived from final-energy balances and end-use indicators, with transparent assumptions and confidence ranges. From COP32 onward, every major final-energy electrification claim should carry a useful-energy translation.

The larger lesson is denominator discipline. Primary energy is for exposing fossil-era waste and supply-side accounting. Final energy is for reading official targets and energy balances. Useful energy is for judging how much of the economy has actually moved to efficient service. The transition needs all three in the data, but only one tells us what the economy actually gets.


This is the public version of a TFIE Strategy Briefing analysis on primary, final and useful energy. Read the full analysis: Stop Steering With The Wrong Energy Metrics.


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Michael Barnard

Michael Barnard is Chief Strategist at TFIE Strategy and publisher of Michael Barnard’s TFIE Strategy Briefing at briefing.tfie.io. He works with investors, infrastructure strategists, NGOs, startups, policymakers, and public-interest organizations on reality-based decarbonization strategy, investment-thesis testing, technology diligence, 2030-2050 transition roadmaps, reports, keynotes, and strategic reality checks. His work tests energy, industry, transportation, infrastructure, and climate-tech pathways against physics, economics, operating evidence, denominators, comparators, and time. Michael’s analysis spans grids, storage, electrification, hydrogen, maritime and aviation fuels, critical minerals, China’s clean-tech scale, industrial decarbonization, geothermal, nuclear and SMR claims, and odd technoeconomic questions such as seabed mining and sulfur supply. Across those topics, his focus is consistent: separating real transition progress from pilots, subsidies, announcements, orderbooks, and narrative momentum. At Michael Barnard’s TFIE Strategy Briefing, free posts carry the public argument, while paid subscribers get the professional layer: Transition Pathway Scorecards, evidence notes, denominator checks, update triggers, reports, and decision-grade context for people working around the energy transition.

Michael Barnard has 1432 posts and counting. See all posts by Michael Barnard