Putting MWh over an industrial hydrogen supply chain changes the framing, not the underlying market: real buyers still purchase hydrogen by mass.
Global hydrogen demand exceeded 100 million tonnes in 2025, and almost all of it was still consumed where hydrogen has been used for decades: refining and industry. That is why kilograms and tonnes are not merely traditional units. They describe the market that exists. An ammonia plant buys a chemical … [continued]
AI has changed the data-center electricity story. Demand is rising much faster than it did through much of the 2000s and 2010s, hyperscale facilities are being proposed and built at extraordinary scale, and utilities in several US regions are confronting loads large enough to affect generation planning, substations, transformers and … [continued]
New nuclear becomes financeable by shifting construction, financing or revenue risk toward governments, state institutions and regulated electricity customers.
Nuclear power works. It produces low-carbon electricity, avoids the health burden of fossil-fuel combustion, provides firm generation and can operate for many decades. My skepticism about building large new nuclear fleets has never depended on pretending otherwise. The more interesting question is why countries that have built nuclear successfully have … [continued]
Long-range pathways through 2100 provide the outside view needed to turn 2050 targets into practical grid, port, energy-system and investment roadmaps.
Most decarbonization scenarios stop at 2050 because policy targets do. Steel mills, aircraft fleets, ports, electricity grids and industrial supply chains do not. A pathway can reach net zero in a target-year spreadsheet while leaving behind an energy system that is expensive, physically implausible or dependent on technologies that never … [continued]
The electrolyzer stack is only the visible component; safety, uptime, service and commercial risk sit in the industrial system around it.
CPH2 did not merely lose an experimental electrolyzer. Its destructive test failure exposed a mismatch between the product the company promoted and the business it was actually trying to operate. After more than a decade of development, a public listing and roughly £50 million in disclosed financing before its 2026 … [continued]
Hydrogen demand gets smaller when speculative energy uses are filtered out and the surviving industrial molecule uses remain.
Hydrogen demand is usually discussed as if the world is about to discover a giant new fuel market. That is the wrong starting point. Hydrogen is already a very large industrial molecule, but most of that demand is tied to the fossil-fuel system, fertilizer, methanol and process chemistry. It’s a … [continued]
Energyminer has something much better than a rendering. Its Energyfish is a small floating hydrokinetic turbine, mostly underwater, anchored in a river current, sending power to shore through a cable and feeding a land-side power box for grid-compliant electricity. It is not a dam, not a conventional run-of-river hydro plant … [continued]
A cheap red-flag pass can often show whether a climate-tech claim deserves deeper diligence, sharper questions or a hard pause before money or policy support follows.
Climate-tech claims usually arrive with a promise and a request attached. The promise is that a new process, fuel, device, material, reactor, storage system or platform will solve a difficult part of decarbonization. The request is for public funding, private capital, procurement support, regulatory preference, a grant, a mandate, a … [continued]
Electricity’s strategic value is the shared platform between many energy sources and many useful services.
One of the easiest ways to get the energy transition wrong is to treat electricity as just another fuel. Coal, oil, gas, hydrogen, ammonia, methanol and electricity are often placed in parallel columns, as if the future is mainly a substitution table. That framing preserves too much of the fossil … [continued]
Economic growth once pulled fuel demand upward by default. Electrification, efficiency, slowing population growth, and the end of China’s first-build materials pulse are weakening that old relationship.
For most of the 20th century, a simple assumption worked well enough for energy forecasting: when economies grew, fuel demand grew with them. More people, more housing, more vehicles, more factories, more roads, more ports, more airports, more concrete, more steel, more coal, oil, and gas. The relationship was not … [continued]
