The Ripple Effect: U.S. EV Slowdown & The Future Of ICE Service Businesses

In July 2025, the Trump administration moved to slow the pace of electric vehicle adoption in the United States through a package of policy reversals and trade measures. Federal purchase incentives for new and used EVs will end on September 30, the national charging infrastructure program has been shut down, and California’s authority to enforce its zero-emission vehicle mandate has been rescinded. The administration has also imposed steep tariffs on imported EVs and auto parts, while opening investigations that could extend similar duties to critical battery minerals and key EV components. These steps land at a moment when U.S. EV sales are edging toward a tipping point, raising questions about whether policy headwinds can stall a market already shaped by global momentum and shifting consumer economics.

These actions have immediate and long-term implications. They raise prices, reduce consumer incentives, and send mixed signals to automakers that had been ramping up production in expectation of stricter emissions standards. The net effect is a slowdown in the S-curve of EV adoption, with the United States now facing a delay in reaching key tipping points in the transition away from internal combustion.

This piece is part of an intermittent series of articles on the coming tipping points in EV adoption indicated by the complementary systems change observations of diffusion of innovations, logistic growth or the s-curve, and complex adaptive systems, introduced in the first article. The second dealt with changes when 5%–15% penetrations of EVs were reached, something already present in some markets. The third dealt with the critical 15%–40% range, when change is accelerating and the internal combustion services industry starts feeling the impacts. The fourth dealt with the next big transition, the 40%–80% range, when internal combustion service firms start shuttering en masse, requiring significant governmental assistance transitioning work forces. The fifth article explored where Europe is and where it will be, with the conclusion being that it will be well into the deep transformation away from internal combustion vehicles by 2035. After this article on the United States, I’ll likely assess China and India before winding up the series.

Under the new policy environment in the United States, the path from 5% to 15% BEV share of new vehicle sales will likely extend into the late 2020s, a slower climb than the three to four years seen in markets with supportive policies. Automakers may prioritize profitable gasoline and diesel trucks and SUVs in the absence of aggressive fuel economy rules. Without federal purchase incentives, the affordability gap between EVs and comparable ICE models widens, especially with tariffs adding thousands of dollars to the sticker price of many imported EVs and components. This slows consumer adoption, particularly among buyers in middle and lower income brackets who are more price sensitive. Charging infrastructure growth will also be affected, as the freeze on federal funding removes a key support for expanding public charging in areas where private investment is not yet viable.

If this policy stance persists beyond 2028 under continued MAGA-aligned leadership, the result will be a drawn-out progression toward the 40% tipping point where EVs enter the majority of new sales. That milestone, which could have been reached in the early 2030s, would likely slip into the mid-2030s. The gap will be especially visible when comparing the U.S. to Europe and China, where aggressive mandates, incentives, and infrastructure buildouts are keeping adoption on a steeper curve. The U.S. would remain a large market, but increasingly out of sync with global EV trends.

If there is a political shift in 2028 and federal support is restored, the adoption curve could bend back toward the faster trajectory. Restoring tax credits, reimposing strong emissions standards, and resuming charging network funding could see the U.S. move from 15% to 40% EV sales share in four to six years, catching up with the global leaders by the early 2030s. Automakers would still have the product pipelines and supply chain improvements developed for other markets, making a rapid acceleration feasible once the policy environment turns favorable again. However, the years lost to slower growth cannot be recovered, and the market would still be behind where it could have been without the interruption.

An often-overlooked dimension of this slowdown is its impact on the secondary ICE service sector. In countries with faster EV adoption, businesses focused on ICE servicing — muffler shops, oil change franchises, and independent engine repair garages — have already begun to see demand fall, leading to closures or shifts toward EV-related work. Norway’s rapid transition forced many such businesses to retrain or exit. In much of Europe, urban areas are experiencing the same pattern.

In the U.S., a slower EV ramp means these businesses will retain a customer base for longer, delaying the urgency to adapt. While this may be seen as a reprieve for some, it also risks leaving service networks less prepared for the eventual acceleration in EV adoption. The skills, equipment, and investment needed to serve an EV-dominated fleet will still be necessary, and delaying the shift can make the eventual transition more disruptive.

With federal policy turning against electric vehicles and tariffs making imported EVs more expensive, U.S. automakers are likely to double down on selling profitable gasoline and diesel trucks and SUVs into the domestic market. This will keep their ICE production volumes high at home, but it will also mean falling further behind competitors in Europe, China, and other regions where EV adoption is accelerating and automakers are scaling electric platforms aggressively.

By focusing resources on defending domestic ICE sales rather than competing for global EV market share, U.S. manufacturers will further cede leadership in battery technology, supply chain integration, and high-volume electric production to foreign rivals. Over time, this will make it harder for them to sell competitively priced and technologically advanced EVs abroad, reducing export opportunities and narrowing their relevance in the international automotive industry. This in turn will have more domestic impacts.

Comparing the U.S. to other countries underscores how policy and market signals influence the pace of change in both vehicle sales and secondary services. In China, where national policy strongly supports EVs, automakers, suppliers, and service networks are aligning quickly with the electric future. In Europe, phased bans on new ICE sales, combined with dense charging networks and purchase incentives, are compressing the adoption timeline. The secondary service sector there is adapting faster, with growing numbers of EV-specialized repair facilities and declining numbers of ICE-focused shops. In the U.S., the current policy direction risks prolonging reliance on ICE vehicles and the services that support them, even as the rest of the world moves more quickly toward electric mobility.

The EV transition in the United States is still inevitable over the long term. Costs will continue to come down, technology will improve, and many states will keep pushing forward regardless of federal policy. But the timeline to reach critical tipping points is now more dependent on the political cycle. A supportive federal stance after 2028 could reignite momentum and close the gap with other major markets.

Continued resistance could leave the U.S. trailing for much of the next decade, with the impacts felt not only in new vehicle sales but across the entire automotive ecosystem, from manufacturing to fueling to repair and maintenance. The shape of the adoption curve is still being decided, and with it the country’s place in the global shift to electric transportation.